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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY-VOTING IN ENGLAND, . 1832 - 1918(*)
Gary W . Cox(+)
1 . Introduction
Modern British government is government by party leaders in Cabinet ; the
leaders of that party which secures a majority 1 in the House of Commons have
full power over what the government does and does not do during their 'term
in power, and there are neither. American-style institutional nor European-
style coalitional checks and balaces to temper that power
. It is still the
Crown in Parliament" which formally takes or authorizes every legislative or
administrative action, and the courts have never had a power of judicial
review to void such actions as unconstitutional . Of the three major , compo-
nents of the Crown in Parliament the Commgns, the Lords, and the Sovereign
- the first is now virtually 'unchecked . The House of Lords can only minimal-
ly delay acts of the Commons, and both the Lords and the Crown have long '
since lost their ability to veto (much less initiate) legislation . Since
those in the Cabinet control the agenda of the House of Commons ; since the
Cabinet almost invariably consists solely of the leaders of the' party with a
majority of seats in the Commons - only in extraordinary circumstances does
the ruling party share its power and responsibility with others; and since
the influence of party on voting in Parliament is extremely strong : "Almost
all of the MPs belonging to each party vote almost all of the time as their ,
party leaders direct" (Penniman, 1981, p . 2) ; the Commons itself has in
essence only retained a veto over the legislative proposals of the majority
party's leaders who sit in the Cabinet
._ As a récent essay on legislation in
Britain notes, " . .
.today's conventional wisdom is that the parliamentary
stages of the legislative process are, for purposes of getting policies
converted into laws, the least creative one ; that Parliament has relin-
quished any capacity for legislative initiative it may once have possessed
to the executive in its midst; that Parliament 'legitimates' but does not
'legislate" (Walkland and Ryle, 1981, p . 91).
Corresponding to this accepted view of a party-dominated legislative process
is a conception of Parliamentary elections as essentially methods of choo-
sing which party shall rule . Representation in modern Britain is conceived
of as almost exclusively "national" and party-based ; what might be called
"local" representation, where each MP acts as ' a delegate or trustee of his
constituents' specific policy concerns, is scarcely mentioned at all.
The topic of this paper, broadly construed, is the historical development of
the system of representative democracy just sketched, although obviously
this is a very large topic indeed and one which exceeds the scope of an
essay
. This paper shall have nothing to say about the decline of the Crown
and the Lords relative to the Commons, nor shall more than passing reference
be made (until Section V) to the procedural decline of the private member
relative to the Cabinet in the early 19th century - what one scholar has
described as the losing of the initiative by the House of Commons"
(Cromwell, 1968).
(+) Address all communications to : Gary W
. Cox, The University of Texas,
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Somewhat more, notice will be taken of the development of strict party voting
discipline in parliament, . as this relates closely to the main topics of this
essay . Since A. L. Lowell's pioneering quantitative study of the influence
of party in legislative voting, it has been evident that aggregate levels of
party discipline in the Commons increased markedly, from levels in the
185o's comparable to those found in American legislatures, to levels in the
189o's comparable to the high standards set by twentieth century Parlia-
ments . A number of explanations for this trend in aggregate party discipline
have been offered. Probably the most widely known and perhaps still the most
widely believed explanation, associated with Mosei Ostrogorski, focuses on
the development of local party organizations. loyal to the party leadership
after the passage of the second Reform Act (1867) . In Ostrogorski's view,
these organizations quickly established a monopoly of electoral organization
in the newly expanded constituencies and used overt electoral threats to
pressure MPs into toeing the party line (Ostrogorski, 1902).
The main focus of this paper will be on the role of elections in the British
representative system, and how this role may have changed over time . A first
concern is with voting behavior . By 1959, R . T. McKenzie can write that
most observers are now fairly firmly agreed that a particular candidate,
whatever his merits, is not likely to add or substract more than about
500 - 1,000 votes to the total his party would win, regardless of who had
been nominated"( McKenzie 1963 p . 5) ; and indeed a very similar judgment was
given by Ivor Jennings twenty years earlier : "In general, the electors vote
not for a candidate but for a party . A bad condidate may lose a few hundred
votes and a good candidate may gain a few hundred" (Jennings, 1939, p
. 27).
Suprisingly, however, the question of when voters began to vote for parties
rather than candidates has not been the subject of much sustained quantita-
tive research. There appear to be three different answers given in the
historical literature . On the one hand, H . J . Hanham, whose Elections and
Party Management is the standard work on the period of the second Reform Act
(1867 - 85), emphasizes the continued importance of the personal influence
exerted by candidates and constituency elites down to the third Reform Act:
"The electoral history of the period between 1832 and . 1885 is largely the
history of electoral influence" (Hanham., 1968, p . 13) . This would seem to
put the development of a party-oriented electorate in the post-1885 period.
Apparently agreeing with this position, Kenneth Wald in his recent study of
class- and religion-based voting writes that-"during the period of the
third Reform Act, elections acquired their decisive modern function as the
major machanism linking the actions of the rulers with the wishes of the
ruled . As the concept of the popular mandate gained legitimacy, elections
were treated as referenda upon current issues, and the distribution of the
vote was taken as a . measure of public reaction to party policy" (Wald, 1983,
pp. 6 7).
A second perspective on the influence of party in electoral voting sees it
first becoming significant after 1867. Writing of the period between the
second and third Reform Acts, E . J . Feuchtwanger asserts the "members of
Parliament and their leading supporters now saw public opinion swayed pre-
dominantly by national issues and by the manner in which the national
leaders handled these issues" (Feuchtwanger, 1968, p . 218) . Similarly, J. P.
Mackintosh assumes that electors after the second Reform Act "voted for a
party and a programme" (Mackintosh, 1962, p . 162).
Yet a third, and very strongly stated, opinion on the development of parti-
san attachments in the electorate is offerd by John Vincent . According to
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Vincent, the explosive growth in the number Of newspapers after the removal
of the Stamp Tax in 1856, and the highly patltisan propaganda to which the
new press exposed their readers, caused a rapid and "massive development of
party loyalities throughout the country" (Vincent, 1966, p . 82) in the
Although these answers are clearly at variance with one another, not much
progress has been made in arbitrating between them . In part, this is because
all three answers are based largely on local evidence which is difficult to
compare across time . Of the authors cited above, only Hanham and Wald make
much reference to electoral statistics in addressing the question of party
voting, and both are interested chiefly in somewhat different (although
related) topics. Recent quantitative work on Victorian electoral behavior,
while pointing in the direction of a more definitive answer, has not yet
gone far enough.
This more recent and quantitative work can be divided into two streams based
on the primary electoral document used. On the one hand, the most detailed
analyses are offered by those scholars using p011 books . Before the esta-
blishment of secret voting by the Ballot Act of 1872, voting at Parliamenta-
ry elections was public and viva voce . Often the vote(s) of each elector
were recorded, together with his name (and sometimes occupation, religion,
residence, etc.), in documents known as poll books . Recently, using tech-
niques of nominal record linkage, scholars have begun to examine the voting
behavior of individual electors over a series of 1elections (Mitchell, 1976;
Mitchell and Cornford, 1977, Drake, 1981) . While this work is extremely
useful and obviously bears directly on the question of whether voters tended
to vote consistently for the same party, thus far there are far too few
studies to support generalizations about the country-wide level of party
voting across time.
A second strand of quantitative work on Victorian electoral behavior uses
documentary evidence available for the double-member districts which predo-
minated before 1885 (see Section II) . Using this evidence, T . J. Nossiter
was able to calculate the rate at which Victorian voters in 25 northern
double-member boroughs split their votes between the parties : casting one of
their votes for the Conservatives and the other for the Liberals (see Sec-
tion II for a fuller discussion of voting in double-member districts).
Interestingly, Nossiter found no tendency for voters to split their votes
less frequently in the 186o's, which would certainly count against Vincent's
thesis (Nossiter, 1975, p . 178). However, J . C . Mitchell's similar study of
32 "frequently contested" boroughs does find a "secular trend toward firmer
party voting over time," and would lend more support to Vincent's conten-
tions (Mitchell, 1976, p . 121) . Unfortunately, both Nossiter and Mitchell
halt their investigations with the election of 1868, so that not only is it
difficult to gauge the national trend of party voting in the 186o's, given
that the evidence is in dispute, but no statement at all is possible about
later years. So the question remains : When did party voting take hold in the
electorate?
 with the election of 181
The first specific aim of this paper is to provide an answer to that ques-
tion based on an analysis of split voting (and what we refer fo as "non-
partisan plumping") in over a thousand election contests held in 198 double-
member constituencies in the period 1832 - 1910. To anticipate the results
somewhat, the broad outline of changes in party voting in the electorate is
found to be remarkably .similar to the outline of changes in party voting in
the legislature . Leading into the Parliament of 11841 - 47, which Aydelotte
has shown to have been highly partisan (Aydelotte, 1963), the election of
1841 registers the lowest split voting rate of all General Elections hel
W
dd
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under the terms of the first Reform Act . After the dispute over the Corn
Laws shattered the Conservative party in the Commons, a period of low party
discipline both in Parliament and in the constituencies follows, lasting
well into the 1850's . Party voting begins to recover in both arenas by the
186o's, reaching very high levels in the 1870's, which are maintained (with
some flucuations) for' the rest of the period down to 1910.
The correlation at the aggregate level between legislative and electoral
party voting naturally prompts the questions of why and how such a correla-
tion exists . Is there a constituency-by-constituency relationship between
split voting and dissidence in parliament? If so, would this not indicate a
system of "local" rather than "national" representation, what in the Ameri-
can literature is often studied under the heading of "constituency in-
fluence"?
A second concern of this paper is to investigate in a systematic and quanti-
tative way the influence of constituents over their MPs . Several historians
(e.g ., Davis, 1972 ; Olney, 1973) have given striking local historical evi-
dence of the pressure exerted by constituents on the roll-call voting of
Victorian MPs, but the only quantitative study to date is that of Aydelotte
(Aydelotte, 1977) . Although Aydelotte finds a considerable correlation be-
tween the demographic characteristics of constituencies (taken to indicate
their economic and political interests) and the voting behavior of their
MPs, even controlling for party, he notes no explicit evidence of electoral
pressure . For example, Aydelotte find that MPs who had to face a contest in
1841 were no more likely to toe the constituency line than were those who
were returned unopposed . Hence, there is as yet no quantitative evidence of
electorally secured constituency influence in Victorian England.
The second specific aim of this paper is to provide such evidence . Two basic
studies are undertaken . First, for the Parliaments of 184 1 - 47, 18 5 2 - 57
and 1874 - 80, agreement scores (giving the percentage of times two MPs
voted in the same way when both voted) are calculated for randomly selected
pairs of MPs. It is found that pairs of MPs from the same double-member
constituency agreed more often than pairs not from the same constituency,
even controlling for party . Second, for the Parliaments of 1841 - 47 and
1852 - 57, it is shown that those MPs from double-member districts who
depended the most heavily for their election to Parliament on split votes
tended to cast more roll call votes dissenting from their own party's posi-
tion and agreeing with that of the other party - what Berrington has called
"crossbench dissents" (Berrington, 1968) . The second analysis in particular
shows a direct connection between electoral and legislative voting behavior.
But if there was a policy nexus between Victorian MPs and their consti-
tuents, how long did it last? Did it begin to weaken as voters became more
party-oriented? A third, and more speculative, concern of this paper is to
deal with these questions.
2 . Double-Member Districts
The modal type of district in England from the thirteenth through most of
the nineteenth century was double-member, with the next most common type
being single-member . In the period between the first (1832) and second
(1867) Reform Acts, 53 English constituencies (21%) returned one member, 1 93(76%) returned two members, and eight (3%) returned three or four members.
After the second Reform Act, the number of English double-member districts
fell to 163, or 61% of all English constituencies . Only 23 double-member
districts remained after the massive redistricting connected with the third
Reform Act .
- 6 -
Electors in the double-member districts had two votes, which they could cast
in any manner they wished, short of giving both votes to the same candidate.
Thus, in a three candidate contest, such as that held at the General Elec-
tion of 1874 in Pontefract between the Rightl Hon . H. C. E. Childers (a
Liberal), Samuel Waterhouse (a Conservative) ; and Viscount Pollington (also
a Conservative), there were six ballots which could legally be cast : those
voting for Childers and Waterhouse, for Childers and Pollington, and for
Waterhouse and Pollington - these , three being all the possible "double"
votes, in contemporary parlance ; and those voting for Childers alone, for
Waterhouse alone, and for Pollington alone - these being all the "single"
votes or ' lumpers" . As it turned out - and this was typical - the electors
of Pontefract employed all six kinds of ballot in 1874, as can be seen in
Figure 1, which displays the number of ballots of each kind cast in that
election . Elections in Victorian Britain (even those after the secret ballot
had been introduced in 1872) were often documented in essentially the format
of Figures in the newspapers or at the backs of poll books, and it is on
these invaluable electoral records ("ballot counts") that much of the analy-
sis in this paper is based.
Two basic statistics are easily computed from ballot counts, both pertaining
directly to the degree to which voters based their electoral decisions on
their attitudes toward the parties. The most obvious of these statistics is
the "split voting rate", equal to the percentage of voters who cast votes
for candidates of different parties . In Pontefract, 182 voters cast
Childers/Waterhouse, and 53 cast Childers/Pollington ballots, these amoun-
ting to 14.2% of the total ballots (and voters, since there was one ballot
per voter). Hence, the split voting rate for this contest is 14 .2%.
Another simple statistic calculable from ballot counts, the "non-partisan
plumping rate", is the percentage of electors who cast a plumper for a
candidate when another candidate of the same party was available . For ex-
ample, in Pontefract, 6o voters cast single ballots for Waterhouse and 37
did the same for Pollington . As these voters were distinguishing between
members of the same party, they evidently .employed criteria other than
partisan preference.
Both the split voting (SV) and non-partisan plumping (NPP) rates (or similar
measures) have been employed by various scholars in previous studies (e .g .,
Phillips, 1982 ; Hanham, 1978 ; Nossiter, 1975 ; Mitchell, 1976; Speck and
Gray, 1975 ; Miller, 1971). However, for Victorian elections, the only major
investigations are' those of Nossiter and Mitchell mentioned in the intro-
duction, and some limitations of these studies should be noted . First, both
scholars focus on a subset of borough ' contests, in Nossiter's case those
borough contests documented in W. W
. Bean's compendium The Parliamentary
Representation of the Six Notern Counties of England (which he supplements
with some southern boroughs contests for comparison) ; and in Mitchell's case
those contests held in 32 "frequently contested" boroughs
. Second, both
studies cover only the 1832 - 68 period
. The data set collected for this
paper is intended to contain all available ballot counts - whether for
county or borough contests - in the period 1832 - 1918
. While falling short
of that ideal, the sample is large enough so that generalizations about
nation-wide trends in English voting behavior can be made with some confi-dence.
3 . The Data
In total, the data set contains 1,005 ballot bounts from the 20 General
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Elections held between 1832 and 1918 (I)
. The yearly distribution of these
is given in Table 1 . Naturally, the number of ballot counts is considerably
greater on average for the twelve elections held before the third Reform Act
(73 . 5) than for the eight elections held afterwards (15 .4), since, as noted
above, only 23 double-member districts survived the redistricting of 1885.
The size of the yearly subsamples can be gauged relative to a number of
standards
. First, one can compare the number of ballot counts actually
collected to the number which might possibly have been collected
. This
latter number is equal simply to the number of double-member constituencies
which were contested; for, if a constituency was uncontested - i .e ., there
were no more candidates seeking office than there were seats to be had - no
poll of the voters was taken at all and hence, of course, no record of their
votes was possible
. By this standard, the sample is fairly large; before
1885, generally over 50%, and on average over 6o%, of the contested double-
member constituencies in any given year are represented in the yearly sub-
sample; after 1885, 73% of the contested constituencies are represented in
the average year.
A second consideration in assessing the size of the sample is the number of
voters whose behavior is summarized in the data
. For each year, the total
number of persons who voted in constituencies for which a ballot count
exists is given in column 3 of Table 1, and this figure is expressed as a
percentage of all voters, and of all registered electors, in columns 4 and
5
. The average number of persons represented in the sample in any given year(1832 - 1910) is 237,725
. Before 1885, the yearly subsamples constitute on
average 31
.9% of the total English voting population, and 20
.7% of the total
registered population (where both these populations refer to the whole of
England, not just to English double-member districts)
. After 1885, the
corresponding figures are much lower, 6 .8% and 4
.8%, respectively.
Although the sample is not random, before 1885 it is broadly representative
of the target population
. There is no geographic bias evident : all regions
of the country have substantial_ representation in each yearly subsample down
to 1880
. The only obvious bias is a rather mild tendency for smaller consti-
tuencies to be over-represented
. The borough population is more than propor-
tionately likely to be sampled-than the county population (and I suspect
that the small borough population is more than proportionately likely to be
sampled than the large borough population)
. As . seen in Table 2 (which refers
to a subsample to be explained presently), on average about 55% of all
contested boroughs were sampled (i
.e ., had ballot counts) while only about
47% of contested counties were sampled
. The explanation for this seems to be
that ballot counts were more difficult to compile for larger constituencies.
Sometimes the official counting of votes would proceed by tabulating bal-
lots, and then of course there was no difference between large and small
constituencies
. But sometimes the official count was directly of votes, and
then newspapers or other unofficial sources of ballot counts faced a larger
task of counting from poll books in the larger constituencies.
After 1885, constituencies in the sample are no longer representative of
English constituencies generally, since only 23 provincial boroughs (not the
largest, but in the second
. tier) remained as double-member districts after
the third Reform Act
. These provincial broughs were geographically dis-
persed, however, including for example Bath, Blackburn, Derby, Ipswich,
Portsmouth, and York, and they are not unrepresentative, at least before1885 : if average SV and NPP rates for these borughs are computed for each
General Election down to 188o, these figures correlate at
.92 with the
averages based on the full sample (see appendix)
.
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For the most part, the data will be interpreted here as a sample of voters
from the entire English voting population, ather than as a sample of
double-member election contests from the popûlation of all contests, on the
reasoning that what is of interest is nation-wide trends in individual
voting behavior
. Practically speaking, all this means is that instead of
computing SV and NPP rates for each constituency, and then taking the simple
average of these figures as an indication of national voting behavior, a
weighted average of the constituency figures , (where the weights are the
total number of voters) will be used
. This is equivalent to pooling all the
voters in each yearly subsample and computing the statistics directly, as if
the whole subsample were one constituency
. None of the conclusions reached
in the text depend on the choice of weighted rather than simple averages
(see appendix).
For the purposes of this paper, attention needs to be paid to the types of
election contests contained in the yearly subsamples . For example, a contest
between a Conservative, a Liberal, and a Chartist must by definition have a
zero NPP rate and will probably have a high SV rate
. But is is unlikely that
the split votes cast in such a contest reflect clearly "non-partisan" moti-
vations . Hence, such three-way contests, and indeed, Any contests involving
more than two parties (which are rare in any event), will be excluded from
analysis
. Similarly, contests between three Liberals must by definition have
a zero SV rate and will probably have a high NPP rate. But once again, it
seems inappropriate to consider plumpers cast in such an election as indica-
tions of non-partisan motivations . ' Hence, anÿ contest with more than two
candidates of any party (also a rarity) will be excluded from analysis.
These exclusions mean that only two kinds of contests will be considered in
the tables that follow : those pitting two candidates of one party against a
lone member of another (two-against-one
. contests), and those involving a
pair of candidates from each of two parties (two-against-two contests).
These contest types were by far the most frequent, together accounting for
901 contests, or 89.7% of the full sample . The 'size of his subsample can be
gauged from the figures in Table 2, which also give a breakdowns of the
information on ballot counts for boroughs and counties separately
. On ave-
rage, the yearly subsamples before 1885 represent 28 .2% of the total English
voting population . After 1885, this average falls to 6 .4%.
A distinction between two-against-one and two-against-two contests should
also be noted
. One reason suggested by contemporaries for split voting in
two-against-one contests was that the partisans of the party putting up only
one candidate had an incentive to use their second votes to help the lesser
evil in the other party . This incentive to cross vote did not exist when
there were two candidates from both parties, and it was often argued that
running a single candidate was bad strategy, since the second votes of one's
own partisans might be the cause of defeat (Hanham, ' 1978, .p . 197). Whether
running one candidate was bad strategy or not, contemporaries were appa-
rently correct that the incentive to cast split Notes in two-against-one
contests was greater than that in two-against-two contests ; the mean split
voting rate in the 594 three-candidate contests from the sample was 17 .1%,
while that in the 307 four-candidate races was 6 .2% . Hence, if the yearly
averages are not to reflect simply changes inithe mix of contest types
(rather than changes in voting behavior), it is sensible to consider con-
trolling for contest type.
4 . Evidence on Non-partisan Voting in the Electorate, 1832 - 1910
The basic trends in non-partisan voting behavior at English elections be-
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tween the first and the fourth Reform Acts can be seen in Tables 3 (for
split voting) and 4 (for non-partisan plumping) . Averages are presented for
all constituencies, and for boroughs and counties separately, without con-
trolling for contest type . The effect of contest type, as well as of deci-
sions regarding the identification of partisan affiliations for candidates,
will be discussed presently.
One way to summarize the findings on split voting in Table 3 is as a testi-
monial to the electoral significance of the Reform Acts . If one looks at the
elections held under the first (1832 65), second (1868 - 8o) and third
(1885 - 1910) Reform Acts, the appearance is as of three successively more
party-oriented electorates: the highest figure for the 1832 - 65 period
(23%) is four times the highest figure for the second period, and five times
the maximum for the third period ; the lowest figures for each period exceed
the highest figures for the next ; and no clear trends are perceptible
throughout any period expcept the second. Perhaps the expansion of the
electorate in 1867 and 1884 simply introduced more and more partisan voters.
Or, perhaps, the redistricting process was such that, both in 1867 and 1885,
the most party-oriented double-member constituencies survived.
Neither of these ideas, as it turns out, stand up to scrutiny . First,
Mitchell has found, in an extensive poll book-based study of the behavior of
the newly enfranchised in 1868, no difference in the behavior of the pre-
and post-1867 electorates . Although a similar study is impossible for 1885,
since poll books ceased to be published after the Ballot Act of 1872,
Mitchell's work effectively scotches an otherwise attractive hypothesis . As
to redistricting, the average SV rate in 1865 for districts which were
reduced to single-member status in 1867 does exceed the rate in districts
which kept both their seats, but the NPP rate goes the other way. The total
non-partisan voting rate (SV + NPP) is 19 .9% for reduced, as opposed to
19.5% for unreduced constituencies . The redistricting hypothesis may hold
more water in 1885 . The non-partisan voting rate in 188o for the 23 boroughs
which remained double-member was 5,8 % as opposed to 9,4 % for constituen-
cies which became single-member . Hence, it may be best to discount compari-
sons made between pre- and post-1885 figures.
Looked at in more detail, the figures in Table 3 can be classified into four
periods . First, the numbers for 1832 - 41 seem to reflect the vicissitudes
of the Conservative party under Peel's leadership, culminating in the very
partisan election of 1841 which swept Peel into office (cf . Close, 1969).
Second, the effect of the Conservative party's split over the Corn Laws is
clearly evident in the extremely high SV rates for the 1847 - 57 period.
Third, the rate declines sharply and monotonically from 19 % in 1857 to
5,5 % in 1868 . Fourth, split voting continues to decline from 1868 to 1886,
thereafter fluctuating, but always remaining below the 1868 level.
It is interesting to note that the figures for boroughs and counties separa-
tely can also be described in the same fashion . Indeed, although in most
years the SV rate in counties was lower than that in boroughs, there is a
close agreement in the temporal pattern of change, and the trends observed
in the combined figures appear in both the borough and county figures.
It should also be noted that the same four-period description of trends can
be applied to the NPP figures presented in Table 4 . Generally, when SV rates
were high, so were NPP rates, and this is true for boroughs and counties
separately as well . The only significant difference in the NPP figures is in
the post-1868 period . Non-partisan plumping continued to decline monotoni-
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cally until 1895, thereafter increasing sharply, and exceeding the 1868
level in 1906 (indeed, one has to go back to 1857 to find a figure higher
than the 7.8% registered for 1906). The reason for the recurrence of high
NPP rates in the 1900s is the appearance of the Labour party and the deci-
sion Made to consider Lib/Lab and Labour candidates as part of the Liberal
party.
In general, the policy on party affiliations adopted here was to construe
the Conservative and Liberal parties as broadly as possible . 'Thus, Tories,
Protectionists, and Liberal Unionists have been classified as Conservatives,
while Radicals, Whigs, Gladstonian Liberals, Lib/Labs, and Labourites have
been classified as-Liberals . Peelites, or Liberal Conservatives, have been
dealt with-as A . L. Lowell did for the later years of his study of party
discipline in Parliament ; that is, most have been labeled as Conservatives,
some as Liberals, on-the basis of their voting behavior and later affilia-
tion (2).
The consequences of this policy on party affiliations are illustrated most
clearly in the post-1900 NPP figures . Although the Labour party ran rela-
tively few candidates before the first World War, the urban constituencies
which remained double-member after 1885 were particularly likely venues for
Labour or Lib/Lab activity, in part because they tended to have a larger
working class population, and in part because the Liberal and Labour
candidates could split the representations (whereas in single-member constituen-
cies, one or the other candidate would have to step down if open conflict
were to be avoided)
. Hence, there are proportionately more contests invol-
ving Labour or Lib/Lab candidatures in . the simple than in the post-1900
polity as a whole . And these contests, say pitting two Conservatives against
a Liberal and a Labourite, tended to have high NPP rates, due chiefly to the
large numbers of plumpers polled for the Liberal and Labour candidates.
Naturally, this species of "non-partisan" plumpers does not seem nearly as
non-partisan as plumpers cast for two mainstream Liberals, and the question
is raised quite generally as to what effect a different policy on party
affiliations would have on the figures - both for non-partisan plumping and
split voting.
In the case of the Labour party, the question does not seem too important.
If Labour is preserved as a separate party, the number of two-against-one
and two-against-two contests after 1900 falls, and so does the NPP rate ; the
SV rate being largely unaffected
. So no important conclusion is affected -
indeed, the trend toward firmer party attachments is reinforced
. But in the
case of the Peelites, one might expect a more important modification of
results, in two ways . First, the high rates of non-partisan plumping in
1847, 1852 and 1857 may be due to classifying Peelites with the two main
parties. Second, since the Peelites occupied the "middle ground" between the
Liberals and Conservatives, classifying them with the main parties may also
have inflated the SV rates.
The best way to address this question is simply to classify all Liberal
Conservatives as members of a separate party, exclude contests involving
them where appropriate, and recompute the figures
. While this has not yet
been done for the full sample, two bits of evidence indicate strongly that
no significant change in the basic pattern of evidence will occur
. First,
for a relatively small subsample, the above procedure has been followed and
no signigicant change was observed in the subsample
. Second, if the hypothe-
sis that the high SV rates in 1847 - 57 are due to misclassification of
Peelites were true, then one would expect that contests pitting two Conser-
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vatives against a single Liberal should generally have higher split voting
rates than contests involving two Liberals and a Conservative, since . the
vast majority of Liberal Conservatives are classified in the sample as
Conservative. As can be seen in Table 5, however, this is. not the case.
Table . 5 presents yearly split voting figures for four subsets of contests:
those involving two Liberals and a Conservative, those involving two Conser-
vatives and a Liberal, all two-against-one contests (the union of the first
two subsets), and all two-against-two contests . Within all categories of
contest, the basic trends visible in the combined data are preserved . Thus,
these trends cannot be attributed to changes in the mix of contests from one
year to the next . And, since the figures for contests between two Liberals
and a Conservative are largely uncontaminated by the presence of Liberal
Conservatives, the increased levels of split voting in 1847 - 57 cannot be
attributed solely to problems of identifying party labels correctly . In the
next section, the proper interpretation of the evidence just presented is
discussed.
5 . The Development of a Party-oriented Electorate
The evidence in Section 4 makes it clear that there were substantial changes
in the obvserved behavior of English voters from 1832 to 1918 . The key
transition period, marking a permanent reduction in the rate at which elec-
tors cast split votes and non-partisan plumpers, was the decade or genera-
tion commencing with the election of 1857. In this section, an attempt is
made to explain the timing of this decline . In order, to do this, however, it
is necessary to have a more complete theoretical understanding of the causes
of non-partisan voting, which takes. account both of the pecularities of
voting in double-member districts and of the impact of publicity on voting
behavior. A full exposition of such a theory is . provided by the author in a
previous work (Cox, 1983) . Here, an abbreviated version will be presented
which takes an expected utility approach to voting behavior (3).
Consider an election between two conservatives, C 1 and C2, and one liberal,
L . For any given voter i, let u i (C 1 ) be the value or utility-to i of
having the first conservative elected, and interpret u i (C2) and ui (L),
similarly. Assume that the utility of having any two 'candidates elected is
simply the sum of the individual utilities ; thus, the value of C 1 and C
winning is u(C 1 ) +u(C 2 ), and so forth (subscript i's will be suppressed).
The kind of decision facing a voter in double-member districts can be illu-
strated by considering a voter for whom u(C 1 ) > u(C 2 ) >u(L) . The most
preferred outcome for this voter is , a conservative sweep (C 1, C 2 ) , the next
most preferred outcome a (C1, L) return, and the least preferred a (C2, L)
victory . ' Clearly, the voter should vote for C l , since the only effect such a
vote can have on the outcome is, to defeat either L or C 2 (those two
candidates receiving the most votes win, and a vote for C1 may raise him above
either L or C2) . . Similarly, the voter . should never vote . for his least
preferred candidate, L. This leaves two options : voting for the two most
preferred candidates, C1 and C 2 , or voting for C 1 alone . Why would a
voter vote onle for C l? Because the, vote for C 2 . is a double-edged sword.
On the one hand,' it might defeat L, a desired result. On the other hand, it
might defeat C1, thus replacing a more preferred by a less preferred
candidate. Depending on how large the utility differentials between C1, C2 and L
are, and on the probabilities that the vote for C 2 will defeat L or C l , it
makes sense for a voter with these preferences to plump . For example, if the
voter intensely prefers the arch-Tory views of C 1 to the middle-of-the-road
Conservatism of C 2 , and does not see much difference between and L, he
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is more likely to plump ; and if the voter thinks it certain that L will be
elected, then the only possible effect of the vote for C 2 is to defeat C 1 ,
and again he is more likely to plump.
Similar points can be made about split voting . Consider another voter for
whom u(L) >u(C 1 ) >u(C 2 ) . This voter is more likely to cast a split vote
for L and C 1 as (s) the utility differential between C2 and C 2 is larger
relative to the utilitity differential between C 1 and L ; and (2) the proba-
bility that a vote for C 1 will defeat C 2 is larger relative to the proba-
bility that it will defeat L.
For the purposes of this paper, the important point is that both non-
partisan plumping and split voting are more likely when voters perceive
significant differences in the value (to themselves) of the election of
candidates of the same party . Hence, from a theoretical perspective, any
trend which reduces the differences which voters perceive between candidates
of the same party will tend also to depress both split voting and non-
partisan plumping. Here, two possible such trends will be discussed : first,
that both the Conservative and Liberal partie's became more homogeneous in
terms of the policy beliefs of their members; and second, that voters weigh-
ted partisan affiliations more heavily in their overall evaluations of
candidates.
The first of these possibilities needs little explanation . To the extent
that one of the criteria used by voters in evaluating candidates was the
degree to which the candidates' personal policy commitments agreed with
those of the voter, an increasing congruity in the policy stands of all
Liberals or all Conservatives should have led to less non-partisan voting
behavior . Although the traditional picture of events does indicate that
there was a polarization of the parties after Parlmerston's death (1865) and
during the struggle to pass the second Reform Act, no overt instance of
homogenization occurs until the crisis over the union with Ireland in 1885
(when the Whigs depart the Liberal party) . Both polarization and homogeniza-
tion are too late to explain the sharp downward trend in non-partisan voting
from 1857 to 1865 . Also, the earliest evidence of an increase in voting
cohesion in Parliament - which might be taken as an indication of encreasing
homogeneity - is in 1871, after most of the action in the SV and NPP rates
is over.
The second explanation for the trends in split voting and non-partisan
plumping postulates an increase in the weight which voters gave to party as
an evaluative cirterion, relative to other such criteria . Suppose, for
example, that voters evaluated candidates chiefly on personal characteri-
stics, partisan affiliation and policy stands . One might picture the voter
abstractly as evaluating or "scoring" each candidate on these three crite-
ria, weighting each score in accordance with importance and then simply
adding the scores to arrive at an overall evaluation . Presumably, this
overstates the degree to which real voters explicitly considered and mea-
sured the various qualities of candidates, but the abstraction is useful in
explaining the gist of what is meant by "party-oriented" . In this simple
model, a voter is totally party-oriented if the only criterion to which any
weight is given is partisan affiliation. Thus, two candidates of the same
party will be identical as far as the voter is concerned and hence, no
voting distinction will be made between them. In general, the greater the
relative weight given to party (i .e ., the more party-oriented the voter is),
the less likely it is that the voter will perceive a sufficient overall
difference between candidates of the same party to vote for one but not the
other (i .e ., to cast a split vote or non-partisan plumper).
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Why would voters have become more party-oriented in the late 1850s and
1860s? There are two basic reasons . First, as already noted above, the Stamp
Tax on newspapers was removed on 1856 . Vincent has put great emphasis on the
importance of the new penny press which arose quickly thereafter in contri-
buting to the "formation of national parties as communities of
sentiment" (Vincent, 1966, p. xx). Often less independent than the older papers,
and more interested in politics as a method of increasing circulation, the
new press tended to be consistently partisan . Verbatim reports of parliamen-
tary debates allowed readers to follow the battle in Parliament each day,
the editorials providing partisan cues . Hence, voters may have become more
party-oriented in part because they were exposed for the first time to a
cheap, mass, and partisan press.
A second reason that voters may have become more party-oriented, and one
that probably operated with increasing strength from the 1830s on, was the
loss of policy initiative by the backbench MP . This occurred in both policy
arenas of Parliament - public and private legislation . Although it is far
beyond the scope of this essay to fully discuss these developments, the
outlines can be sketched.
First, in the arena of public legislation, the House of Commons changed
radically . In the early 1800s, one finds a relatively small active member-
ship operating largely by unanimous consent (in this respect, reminiscent of
the U .S . Senate). Backbench MPs took a prominent part in the initiation and
debate of major pieces of legislation . And an array of parliamentary rights,
e .g ., to obstruct by repeatedly moving that the House do now adjourn", to
claim a hearing at any time by motion made without previous notice, to raise
debates on the presentation of petitions - ensured that the policy concerns
of backbenchers would find their way onto the agenda . As chronicled by Peter
Fraser, all these devices, and a number of others which rose up to take
their places, had been beaten back or totally eradicated by the1850s
(Fraser, 196o; see also Cromwell, 1968 ; COX, .1983) . . By the mid-60s, Walter
Bagehot's series of articles in the Contemporary Review (later published as
The English Constitution) popularized the distinction between the "digni-
fied" and "efficient" parts of the constitution, and made it clear that the
"efficient secret", the controlling power, of the English government lay in
the Cabinet (Bagehot, 1963). Corroborating Bagehot's interpretation, Alpheus
Todd noted in 1866 that " . . .the rule that all great and important . measures
should emanate ' from the executive has of late years obtained increasing
acceptance. ...Sir Rober Peel, in 1844, insisted that 'individual members of
Parliament had a perfect right to introduce such measures as they thought
fit, without the sanction of . the government' . . . .But of late years the great
increase of debates, and the annual accumulation of arrears of public busi-
ness, baye combined to render it practically impossible for Bills introduced
by private members to become law„ unless by the active assistance of the
government (Todd, 1869, Vol . II, pp. 63 - 64).
The decline of the private or backbench member's status in public legisla-
tion" was by no means confined to matters of general of national policy . In
general, the kinds of legislation one most readily thinks of in connection
with individual legislators fall in the area of what Lowi has called distri-
butive policy, concerned with the allocation of geographically divisible
benefits, such , as capital projects and grants for the establishment or
support of various local services (Lowi,  1964). Indeed, one of the most
widely observed behavioral regularities of geographically-based legislators
is the provision of "particularistic" or divisible benefits to their consti-
tuents (Mezey, .1976). It is natural to suppose that Victorian MPs . also
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performed such services, and that they were valued for their ability to do so.
Yet, here also Victorian backbenchers suffered a decline . This is especially
evident when contrasted with the American experience
. The mainstays of the
U.S . Congressman's particularistic usefulness to his constituents have been,
at various times, tariff bills, Civil Service patronage, and local improve
ment bills
. Each of these areas was largely shut off from the influence of
the private member of parliament after the mid-19th century
.'
First, tariff bills, which, with their many separate rates for different
industries proved ideal vehicles for log-rolling in the U .S. Congress down
into the 1930s, simply did not exist in Britain after the definitive triumph
of the policy of free trade in the 1840s . Second, the local Civil Service
patronage of which the member of parliament disposed declined throughout the
19th century . Whereas positions in the Revenue, Postal and other geographi-
cally dispersed branches of the Civil Service were regularly referred to the
recommendation of the local member in the early part of the century, patro-
nage in the Revenue departments began to decline with Lord Liverpool's
renunciation (1820) of the direct appointment of superior offices in the
Customs Service ; and the reforms initiated by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report
(1853), and furthered by Gladstone's Order in Council establishing open
competition (1870), cut back the patronage throughout the Civil Service. The
last bits of local patronage - the provincial postmasterships were turned
over to the surveyors of the postal districts in 1896.
A third area of distributive politics largely closed to the private member
was the pork barrel . Whereas local improvements bills have long been a
feature of American politics, the use of national resources for the benefit
of particular places was largely avoided in Victorian Britain
. Expenditure
on the traditional bulwarks of the American pork barrel - rivers and har-
bors, railways, roads, dams and canals - was almost nonexistent . Except for
expenditures on Harbours of Refuge and in the half dozen boroughs where the
great ship-building shops of the state were maintained, and where the soli-
citude of the local members for such expenditures was proverbial, the go-
vernment spent no money upon harbors. Neither canals nor roads nor railroads
were constructed by the crown (Lowell, 1908, Vol . II, pp . 514 - 519 ; vol . I,
PP . 367 - 393) .
All told, it would seem that public legislation held out increasingly little
for the backbench MP in the elctoral arena . He could not claim to initiate
or even significantly affect either general or distributive policy . Increa-
singly, one suspects, voters and MPs recognized this, and the policy role
constituents expected their MPs to fulfill became essentially that of a
lobbyist - to change the party line from within rather than to oppose it
from without. This, at any rate, was the strategy adopted by a number of
Liberal pressure groups in the 1860s and 1870s (Vincent, 1966).
Roughly concomitant with the decline of the individual MP in the arena of
public legislation came a significant and electorally important change in
procedure on private legislation
. The distinction between private and public
bills was not always exact, especially as regarded the affairs of London,
but generally "every bill for the paricular interest or benefit of any
person or persons" (here included local governments) was regarded as a
private bill (May, 1851, p. 486). Such bills had first been widely used in
promoting turnpike roads and the enclosure of ''commons in the second half of
the 18th century
. In the 19th century, they were used to authorize construc-
tion of canals and railroads, to regulate local police and sanitation, and
to grant private or municipal bodies the authority to undertake the provi-
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sion of water, gas electric light, tramway services, etc. The procedure on
such bills was distinctly different from that governing matters of general
public policy ; although they were regarded as legislation, and had to pro-
ceed through the same formal stages as any other bill, they were also viewed
as controversies between the promoters and opponents of the measure, and the
committee stage of the bill was patterned after a trial in a court of law.
For most of the first half of the century, the private bill committees
consisted chiefly of members directly interested in the measure referred to
them . In 1844, however, the Commons began to staff their railway bill com-
mittees exclusively with impartial members, and this practice was extended
to all other private bills in 1855. Each member chosen for private bill
committee service was thereafter required to sign a declaration that his
constituents have no local interest, and that he has no personal interest"
in the bill to be considered (May, 1851, p . 5 2 9).
These changes reinforced the judicial character of private bill procedure
and limited the services which an MP could render to local interests.
Earlier in the 19th, and in the 18th century, a significant part of the job of
many MPs was to steer through parliament private bills in their consti-
tuents' or patron's (or indeed, their own) interest . The MP generally pre-
pared and introduced the bill, and often reported it from committee (Beer,
1966, pp . 2 5 - 28) . After the removal of interested members from the crucial
committee stage, however, and the previous introduction of paid agents to
prepare the bills, there was not nearly so much that the member could do to
defeat or promote such bills . In committee, the proceeding was judicial ; out
of committee, it was handled mostly by a registered agent retained for the
purpose by the party promoting the bill (and MPs could not be agents) ; only
at stages occurring in the House could the member be useful, and then he was
but one voice in a large assembly.
The general picture that emerges is quite clear . By the 1850s and 1860s, the
individual member of Parliament was a relatively unimportant cog in the
legislative machinery . Constituency elites were presumably the first to
recognize this, but even the ordinary voter was steered toward this recogni-
tion by the new partisan press which focused so heavily on the actions of
party leaders . Elections earlier in the century may well have turned on the
ability of candidates to affect general policy and to provide distributive
benefits (and of course on the question of to whom in the constituency these
benefits were allocated). But, we may suppose that the important changes in
private and public bill procedure did not go unnoticed, which would imply
that the foundation of this kind of an electoral orientation toward
candidates was eroding, its place to be taken by an increased attention and focus
on parties, now the dominant policy actors.
While the declining significance of individual MPs in the policy process and
the development of a cheap partisan press are both plausible reasons to
believe that voters became more party-oriented, there are others as well.
For example, contemporaries thought voters were more party-oriented. Feucht-
wanger and Mackintosh emphasize this, discussing for example the precedent-
setting decisions of Disraeli (in 1868) and Gladstone (in 1874) to resign
office before Parliament met, thereby acknowledging beforehand that their
parties had been defeated and implicitly viewing the function of elections
as the choice of a governing party (Feuchtwanger, 1968 ; Mackintosh, 1962).
Gladstone in making his decision had interpreted a series of by-elections as
turning chiefly on the performance of his Ministry, rather than on the
particular actions of the candidates involved . And, indeed, candidates
themselves seem to have recognized the increased electoral importance of
affiliation with one of the parties . Norman Gash notes that "Politicians in
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the age of Peel still preferred to talk of supporting or giving a fair trial
to Her Majesty's Ministers, occasionally, thcugh less often, of opposing
them ; they spoke of 'the gentlemen with whom I usually act' or more
informally of 'our friends'
. But they did not as a rule talk of being
members of a party ; and they strove to give the appearance of being indepen-
dent and unfettered in their, parliamentary conduct" (Gash, 1982).
By the 1860s, declarations of independence are far less common, and most
candidates in their addresses make a frank avowal of partisan affiliation.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to acc ept the hypothesis that voters
became significantly more party-oriented in the late 1850s, 1860s, and
1870s, however, is the variety of political phenomena which seem to follow
from such an assumption. First, of course, is the decline in SV and NPP
rates documented in the preceding section
. Second, if one accepts Donald
Stokes' reasoning in his study of the nationalization of electoral forces in
the U .S
., one ought to expect the standard deviation of electoral swing in
England to decline as voters became more party-oriented (Stokes, 1965) . Two
scholars, using different techniques to handle the peculiarities of the
double-member district, have performed Stokesian analyses of swing, and both
find a nationalization of electoral forces by the election of1880(Nossiter, 1975 ; Fraser, 1976).
Third, on the basis of the assumption that voters become more party-orien-
ted, one can more satisfactorily explain the increase in voting descipline
in Parliament
. As mentioned earlier, the most widely-known explanation
asserts that local party organizations loyal to the party leadership deve-
loped rapidly after the second Reform Act and enforced discipline by electo-
ral pressure
. This view has, however, come under serious attack . Berrington
has argued that the Liberal organizations, far from supporting the Parlia-
mentary leadership, were more likely to applaud those Members who defied
the Whips and stood firmly for their radical principles . The Liberal Caucus,
at least in the early stages, made for more, not less indiscipline"
(Berrington, 1968, p. 363). And, in a study based on a Conservative Central
Office document describing the state of organization in all English and
Welsh constituencies in 1874, Cox found no tendency for MPs from
highly organized constituencies to be more loyal than those from less or-
ganized constituencies, nor any tendency for discipline to increase with the
founding of an organization (Cox, 1983, ch . 6).
But if party organization is not the explanation for increased party voting
in Parliament, what is? Berrington offers an important part of the answer,
but his focus is exclusively on developments in the 1880s and 1890s, since
it is in these decades that the permanent and important increases in party
discipline appeared to him to occur . Yet, new evidence shows that the levels
of_ loyalty enjoyed by the Conservative Government of 1874 - 8o were compa-
rable to the highest levels of the century (Table 6) . Indeed, the figures in
Table 6 indicate a sharp increase in party discipline in the early 1870s,
after most of the decline in non-partisan voting in the electorate.
I believe there was a direct connection between the two trends
. If one
assume that voters became increasingly more party-oriented, that MPs were
aware of this, and that MPs sought reelection, the materials for an explana-
tion are at hand
. For, when voters began to base their decisions relatively
more on what the parties did, perforce their decisions depended relatively
less on what MPs did as individuals
. In general, this freed MPs from local
electoral pressures - at least relative to what had been true before
. Conse-
quently, it ensured that pressures from the party leadership, even if they
did not increase in strength due to organizational advances, bulked rela-
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tively larger in the voting decisions of MPs, since pressures from the
constituency decreased . A number of students of party voting loyalty among
U
.S . Congressmen emphasize above all else the importance of pressures from
constituents in causing indiscipline in Congress (Mayhew, 1966 ; Brady, et
al ., 1979; Turner, 1951). What is suggested here is that the early Victorian
polity was more American than its 20th century successor in one important
aspect : pressures from constituents were a significant consideration in the
roll call voting decisions of reelection-seeking MPs, and a prime cause of
dissent from the party line : When these pressures diminished as voters
focused their policy demands increasingly on the parties, a significant and
permanent increase in the levels of party cohesion followed.
In the next section, an attempt is made to bolster several points . First,
statistical evidence that constituents did exert an electoral influence on
the roll call behavior of their MPs is offered. Second, statistical evidence
that this influence declined is presented.
6. The Influence of constituents in Victorian England
There is considerable difference of opinion among historians on the role of
the electorate and elections in shaping Parliamentary opinion . At least two
strands of opinion tend to discount the importance of elections in affecting
policy decisions . First, there is the view that elections were largely
controlled by the influence of local elites . This view would at least con-
fine the meaningful expression of electoral opinion to differences among the
elite, and may be pushed to the point of viewing elections as secondary,
with nominations and informal agreements more important . Second, there is
the not incompatible view that Parliamentary elections -"were much more a
drama enacted about the life of the town . . . than a means of expressing
individual opinions about the matters of the day . . . the real issue was not
the Parliamentary representation of the borough, but the relative positions
of the electors within the town" (Vincent, 1966, p . 15). Clearly,-to the
extent that elections did turn chiefly on local rivalries, their use in
communicating the policy preferences of voters - even elite voters - was
lessened.
In contrast both to the emphasis on influence and to that on localism, there
is a strand of opinion which affirms the importance of elections in the
policy process. R . W. Davis in particular has emphasized the grilling of MPs
by their constituents, especially on certain vital issues such as religious
and agricultural policy, and he clearly believes that considerable and effec-
tive electoral pressure was brought to bear on MPs on certain issues (Davis,
1972 ; Davis, 1976) . The activity of electorally-oriented pressure groups,
beginning with the Anti-corn Law League, would seem to fit with this picture
as well (cf . Hamer, 1971).
Surprisingly, there has been only one quantitative effort to address . the
question of the influence of constituents' over their MPs' behavior: W. O.
Aydelotte's study published-in 1977 . Aydelotte asks whether any correlation
can . be discerned between the interests of the constituencies, on the one
hand, and the voting positions taken by the MPs representing them, on the
other . The interests are determined by a rough demographic classification
intended to catch the relative rural or urban proclivities of the constitu-
encies . In England, for example, counties and small boroughs are presumed to
have been predominantly urban : Aydelotte finds that the more rural consti-
tuencies were more likely to have been represented by MPs whose voting
records (as summarized by a five point scale) were conservative, and that
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this held both between and within the two major parties (Aydelotte, 1977).
Aydelotte's demonstration of a correlation between the interests of consti-
tuencies and the political positions of their MPs is consistent with the
supposition that Victorian elections did serve to insure agreement on, policy
between representatives and represented
. But when Aydelotte seeks an expla-
nation for his correlation in the electoral process, he does not find it.
MPs who faced contests in 1841 appeared no more likely to "vote their
constituencies" than those returned unopposed; and all shades of political
opinion enjoyed about the same reelection success in the various categories
of constituency
. Aydelotte concludes that, however the correlation between
local interests and the policy positions of MPs arose, it was not obviously
via the electoral process.
This conclusion has been questioned by R
. W. Davis on the grounds that
Aydelotte's methodology does not allow him to capture the importance of
certain key issues which, according to Davis, attracted the bulk of electo-
ral pressure (Davis, 1976)
. Here it will be argued that even if one conti-
nues to focus on the "run-of-the-mill" as well as the "important" issues,
Aydelotte's result can and should be interpreted as evidence of the impor-
tance of local electoral pressures.
It is best first to define what is meant by "electoral pressure", since this
term refers to more than overt electoral threats
. As used here, electoral
pressure on the voting decisions of MPs exists when three conditions are
met : (1) constituents base their votes to some extent on the previous and
anicipated voting behavior of the candidates ; (2) MPs value reelection ; and
(3) MPs are aware that their constituents satisfy condition (1)
. When these
three conditions are met for a given issue or set of issues, the MP will
face electoral pressure : that is, he will recognize that his decision on a
roll call vote may affect his chances for reelection
. Since, by assumption,
the MP values reelection, electoral pressure may influence his decision . It
is important to note that MPs need not be subject to overt forms of electo-
ral brow beating in order to feel pressure . An MP from a homogeneous consti-
tuency, even without any communication whatsbever from his district, will
undoubtedly know what its central interests are, and will recognize without
anyone pointing it out to him that if he votes against those interests he
risks electoral defeat
. Similarly, even on less salient issues, the MP may
well recognize without being specifically notified that certain groups in
his constituency have preferences on an issue which may affect their voting
decisions.
When the three conditions listed above are met with sufficient frequency and
force, a significant correlation between local interests and the votes of
local representatives can be expected
. It is important to note, though, that
this correlation will not come about simply because local pressures conti-
nually overbear the conscience of the MP (or other, competing pressures put
upon him)
. Rather, to a large degree, the correlation arises because (1)
candidates choose to contest constituencies in which they think they have a
chance ; (2) this entails anticipation of the kinds of policy demands the
constituency is likely to make ; and hence (3) successful candidates tend to
agree with their constituents' consensual preferences fairly often
. In other
words, electoral pressure does not just operate at the time of an important
division, with watchful constituents making clear the dire consequences of
an incorrect vote
. It also affects the decisions of candidates whether to
contest a given constituency in the first place, Furthermore, electoral
pressure should operate in this way regardless of whether an actual contest
occurs . It is the possibility of a contest that counts
. Thus, one does not
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find candidates like Charles Bradlaugh even approaching Oxford University,
because they had not a skeptic's chance in paradise of succeeding . Ayde-
lotte's finding that MPs who faced contests were no more likely than those
who did not to toe the constituency line is , largely irrelevant to the
question of how potent local pressures were.
Given this conception of electoral pressure, Aydelotte's work can be inter-
preted as follows . He has identified (albeit crudely) the interests of con-
stituencies along a rural/urban dimension, and found a consistent correla-
tion with the behavior of MPs. This correlation arises partly because
candidates select constutencies in which they can win (with or without a contest)
while constituencies select candidates (with or without a contest) in part
on the basis of their policy stands . The correlation also arises because,
once in office, the MP is reinforced in his own opinions when his consti-
tuents happen to agree, and may defer to his constituents' opinions on
matters over which they disagree . That the correlation remains after con-
trolling for party implies an explanation for dissidence in Parliament.
In the remainder of this section, two other approaches to demonstrating the
importance of local electoral pressures, both in their own right and as a
cause of dissidence, are examined.
One approach attempts to demonstrate a direct connection between the kinds
of votes an MP received when elected and the kinds of votes he cast in the
ensuing Parliament . The basic intuition can be explained by considering an
election between two Liberals and a Conservative at which both Liberals are
returned. Presumably one of the Liberals benefitted to a greater degree from
the support of Conservative partisans, who, rather than plumping for their
party's candidate as a completely party-oriented voter might have done,
split their votes instead. (Indeed, with a ballot count the percentage of
each Liberal's final vote total which came in the form of a split vote can
actually be calculated . This will be the chief independent variable .) The
split votes each Liberal received, if they were cast for political reasons,
represent a potential source of electoral pressure which would presumably
act to pull the Liberal over to the Conservative position on certain issues.
In other words, if voters split their votes because they perceived a simi-
larity in stands between one of the Liberals and the Conservative, then the
Liberal beneficiary of the split, votes will feel' electoral pressure on those
issues once in Parliament, and it may have been in anticipation of receiving
such votes that he entered the contest to begin with . If the policy clea-
vages dividing Liberals and Conservatives in Parliament are congruent with
those in the constituencies, one ought to find Liberal beneficiaries of
split votes voting with the Conservative party more often than Liberals
receiving few split votes . That is, split votes in the constituencies should
induce crossbench dissidence in Parliament . Do they?
In Table 7, multiple regressions estimated for the Parliaments of 1841 - 47
and 1852 - 57 are presented which provide an answer to this question . In
both Parliaments the population under study consisted of all MPs elected at
two-against-one contests . The dependent variable was the rate of crossbench
dissent - the percentage of times the MP voted with a majority of the other
party and against a majority of his own party. The independent variables
were the percentage of the MP's total votes which came in the form of split
votes (SV*), a dummy variable indicating the party of the MP, and an inter-
action term between party and SV* . It was found that, in 1841 - 47, a one
percentage point increase in the split vote support of a Liberal MP led on
average to a .72 percentage point increase in crossbench dissidence, the
coefficient being significant ( t = 3 .37) . Similarly, in the 1852 - 1857
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Parliament, Liberal MPs' rates of crossbench dissent rose .41 percentage
points for every one percentage point increase in split vote support (t =
2 .69) . The estimated behavioral relations for the Conservatives were of the
right sign in both Parliaments but were insignificant.
Given the fact that no controls were possible for other electoral pressures
(only one possible source of pressure has been identified, and hence other
pressures enter the error term), the results reported in Table 7 are about
what might be expected on the assumption that electoral pressure was an
important phenomenon . Although only 11 - 18% of the variance in crossbench
dissent has been explained by these regressions, probably only about that
percentage of the operative electoral pressures have been identified.
The most straightforward interpretation of these ; results is that a good many
split votes were cast for political reasons - that is, voters were anticipa-
ting certain behavior on the part of candidates land voting to support or
induce that behavior
. It might be noted that if the temporal sequence of
things is reversed, a regression predicting split vote support on the basis
of previous crossbench dissents works about as well (Cox, 1983) . Presumably,
this shows voters reacting retrospectively to their MPs' actions . Condition
(1), in other words, is supported.
Condition (2) appears tenable as well . Even considering only those incum-
bents who faced a contest in prospect, 75 .6% sought reelection in the period
1832 - 65 . The increased courting of the press by MPs after 1832 would also
seem to reflect a desire for reelection (cf . Cox, 1 98 3, p p. 35 - 50, for afuller discussion).
If it is accepted that MPs knew the voting criteria of their constituents,
then electoral pressure as here defined existed . The results in Table 7 are
consistent with MPs responding to this pressure.
Further evidence demonstrating that local electoral pressure was important
and supporting the hypotheses that voters became more party-oriented, is
presented in Table 8 . Because of the existence of double- and triple-member
constituencies, one can find pairs of MPs who share (and who do not share)
the same constituency . A simple comparison of the percentage of times two
MPs agreed when both voted (their agreement score) as a function of whether
they did or did not serve the same constituency should provide a rough
measure of the impact of local pressures . In Table 8, these comparisons are
conducted, controlling for party, for the Parliaments or 1841 - 47, 1852 -
57 and 1874 - 80.
The results are quite interesting. When comparing pairs of MPs not sharing
party, there is a significant tendency for colleagues to agree more
frequently than non-colleagues in the early Parliaments, but virtually no
such tendency in the Parliament of 1 874 - 80 . Similarly, the tendency for
colleagues of the same party to agree more often than non-colleagues of the
same party is least in the Parliament of 1874 - 8o, although still signifi-
cant.
The figures in Table 8 serve a double purpose . First, they reinforce Ayde-
lotte's finding of a correlation between the interests of constituencies and
the politics of their MPs. Second, they indicate that such a correlation may
have been declining, when party is controlled for.
This latter conclusion should be approached cautiously
. There is a logical
relationship between aggregate party cohesion and the kind of figures given
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in Table 8 . In the extreme - perfect cohesion - no constituency effect would
be visible when party was controlled, since no two members of the same party
would ever disagree and members of opposite parties would agree only on
unanimous divisions . As it is known that party cohesion was very high in
1874 - 8o, the suspicion is very strong that any examination of roll-call
behavior which controls for party will not find much left to explain . Hence,
the figures in Table 8 do not tell us much more than was to be expected . But
they do tell us something more since, first, it is mathematically possible
that the figures for 1874 - 8o might have been as high as those in 1852 -
57, and second, the insignificant result in Panel I was certainly not gua-
ranteed.
In any event, the pattern of evidence in Table 8 is consistent with the
hypothesis that voters were becoming more party-oriented . Such an orienta-
tion by voters reduces the electoral pressure put on individual MPs by
diverting it to the party leadership. Consequently, MPs are both more depen-
dent for reelection on the leadership's decisions and less dependent on
pleasing constituents with specific votes. To the extent that local
pressures had caused dissent, the developing party orientation of the elec-
torate should concomitantly have reduced the impact of local pressures and
also reduced indiscipline in Parliament .
	
-
7 . Conclusion
It has long been known that a substantial change in English legislative
voting behavior took place in the second half of the nineteenth century:
with increasing frequency, MPs voted with their parties . In this paper, it
has been demonstrated that an equally substantial change in English electo-
ral voting behavior took place, also in the direction of increasing parti-
sanship . It has also been suggested that the correlation between the inte-
rests of constituencies and the votes of their MPs declined over time, when
party was controlled.
A single hypothesis - that voters became more party-oriented - has been
offered as capable of explaining all three trends . In the earlier parts of
the century, when individual MPs still bulked larger in the policy process
of Parliament, voters based their votes to a considerable extent on what the
individual candidate said and did about policy issues . Consequently,
candidates had an incentive (if they sought election) to seek out a compatible
constituency ; and once elected they were aware that their actions poten-
tially had electoral consequences . The result of this was that MPs . would
support the local interests of their constituency even against their party.
Hence, studies such as Aydelotte's and those in Section 6 find a correlation
between how a Victorian MP voted and the type of constituency he served,
even controlling for party . Hence, also, levels of party discipline in
Parliament were relatively low and fluctuating. And finally, the willingness
of electors to vote for candidates rather than parties meant that split
voting and non-partisan plumping were more frequently used electoral
options.
As a variety of factors caused voters to weight the actions of the parties
more heavily in their decisions, the previous system of "local representa-
tion" began to unravel . Since voters based their votes on the behavior of
parties, split voting and non-partisan plumping declined . Further, indivi
dual MPs were to some extent freed of local pressures : there was less need
to ensure a compatible constituency and less need also to make sure that
one's votes gibed with the views of constituents . Consequently, pressures
toward party conformity (from whatever source) bulked relatively larger in
the voting decisions of MPs, and party discipline in Parliament increased . At
the same time, the policy nexus between MPs and their constituents be-
gan to loosen .
APPENDIX
Candidate
Total
Party
	
Plumpers
	
Votes
Rt . Hon . H . C . E . Childers
	
Lib.
Major Samuel Waterhouse
	
Cons.
Viscount Pollington
	
Cons .
699
	
934
60
	
861
	 37
	
709
796
Candidate Pair
	
Double Ballots
Childers/Waterhouse
Childers/Pollington
Waterhouse/Pollington
Total ballots cast = 1,650
182
53
619
854
Figure 1. A ballot count for the election of 1874 in Pontefract .
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Table 1
As a % of
No . of Contests Number of
	
All
with All
	
Double-Member Electors
	
As a % of
	
Registered
Year Ballot Counts Contests Involved
	
All
	
Voters
	
Electors
1832 102 68 231,768 51 38
1835 90 73 140,585 37 22
1837 89 64 189,291 37 26
1841 84 77 155,778 37 20
1847 80 79 140,029 36 17
1852 68 55 129,702 24 15
1857 52 49 112,880 25 13
1859 53 54 96,762 22 11
1865 63 52 150,402 26 16
-149,689
1868 60 47 313,824 22 17
1874 55 47 439,687 498,350 29 21
1880 86 61 741,540 37 32
-73.5 -60.5 -236,854 -31 .9
1885 17 214,491 6 5
1886 15 177,566 8 4
1892 14 205,780 6 5
1895 15 218,817 7 5
1900
	
14 218,559 8 4
1906 15 270,992 6 5
1910(J) 16 299,377 6 5
1910(D) 17 306,675 7 5
-15.4
	
-237,725
	
-6.8
Notes : (1) Column 2 gives the figures in Column 1 as a percentage of the number
of double-member constituencies which were contested .
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Notes, Table 1, continued:
(2) Column 4 gives the figures in Column ' 3 as a percentage of the
estimated number of voters in all English constituencies (both
single- and multi-member) . Before 1885, the estimated number of
voters is arrived at by taking
#contested constituencies
	
x [#registered electors]
#constituencies
Since county constituencies (which were larger) tended to be more
often uncontested, and since we do not take account of turnout
(essentially assuming that it was 100%), thé estimated number of
voters for years before 1885 should be an overestimate, and hence
the size of the sample relative to the population of voters is
probably understated . After 1885 exact figures are available for
the number of voters.
(3) Column 5 gives the figures in Column 3 as percentages of the total
registered electorate in England (not confined to the electorate in
double-member districts) .
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Table 2
Number of Ballot Counts in
Total
	
No.
of
As a % of
All
	
English
Year Boroughs % Counties % All
	
Constituencies % Voters Voters
1832 48 42 28 74 76 50 179,228 40
1835 71 67 9 50 80 65 124,812 33
1837 74 68 14 47 88 63 188,199 37
1841 74 80 8 44 82 74 153,173 36
1847 59 67 6 46 65 64 105,453 27
1852 50 49 5 24 55 44 93,697 17
1857 38 43 6 33 44 42 100,587 22
1859 43 51 4 30 47 48 83,183 19
1865 50 51 11 50 61 50 149,985 26
1868
	
' 29 36 22 48 51 40 282,532 20
1874 34 40 18 56 52 44 404,038 26
1880 52 60 32 59 84 60 704,890 35
1885 15 75 0 15 75 179,486 5
1886 15 79 0 - 15 79 177,566 8
1892 14 74 0 - 14 74 205,780 6
1895 12 60 0 12 60 171,034 6
1900 12 71 0 12 71 184,864 7
1906 15 68 0 15 68 270,992 6
1910(J) 16 73 0 16 73 299,377 6
1910(D) 17 81 0 17 81 306,675 7
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Table 3. Trends in Split Voting, 19832-1910.
All
	
Constituencies Boroughs Counties
Year %
	
N % N % N
1832 15.6 179,228 18.8 49,569 14 .4 129,659
1835 18.7 124,812 20 .6 81,307 15 .0 43,505
1837 10.6 188,199 12 .2 102,387 8.6 85,812
1841 7 .3 153,173 8.1 10.0,068 5 .9 53,105
1847 23.0 105,453 25 .4 77,138 16 .3 28,315
1852 16.3 93,697 16 .2 66,329 16 .5 27,368
1857 19.0 100,587 17 .8 67,300 21 .5 33,287
1859 11.7 83,183 13 .6 60,996 6 .2 22,187
1865 8.5 149,985 10 .3 81,129 6 .3 . 68,856
1868 5.5 282,532 5.5 124,181 5 .4 158,351
1874 4.8 404,038 5.1 255,091 4 .2 148,947
1880 4.5 704,890 4.7 407,546 4 .3 297,344
1885 3.5 179,486 3 .5 179,486 - -
1886 2.3 177,566 2.3 177,566 -
1892 2.7 205,780 2.7 205,780 - -
1895 3.0 171,034 3.0 171,034 - -
1900 4.4 184,804 4.4 184,864 -
1906 2 .7 270,992 2.7 270,992 - -
1910(J) 1.8 299,377 1 .8 299,377 - -
1910(D) 2.0 306,675 2 .0 306,675
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Table 4. Trends in Non-partisan Plumping, 1832-1910.
All
	
Constituencies Boroughs Counties
Year % % %
1832 6.4 8 .1 5 .8
1835 8.7 10.1 6 .2
1837 5.0 4 .2 6 .1
1841 3 .1 3 .2 2 .7
1847 15 .5 17.4 10 .1
1852 9.0 10.4 5 .7
1857 13.8 10 .0 21 .4
1859 5.3 6 .3 2 .4
1865 4.8 6 .5 2 .7
1868 4.2 4 .7 3 .8
1874 4.0 5 .0 2 .2
1880 2.4 2 .8 1 .8
1885 3.2 3 .2
1886 2 .3 2 .3
1892 2 .3 2 .3
1895 1 .8 1 .8
1900 3.4 3.4
1906 7 .8 7 .8
1910(J) 3.4 3 .4
1910(D) 3.8 3 .8
Note : N's are the same as those in Table 3.
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Table 5 . Split Voting by Contest Type.
Year 2L/1C 2C/1L 2/1 2/2
1832 15 .2 152,001 19 .1 19,969 15 .i7 171,970 13 .1 7,258
1835 21 .0 73,807 17 .4 36,173 19 .8 109,980 9 .9 14,832
1837 11 .8 80,733 12 .5 59,306 12 .1 140,039 6 .2 48,160
1841 7 .8 35,412 12 .3 51,793 10 .5 87,205 3 .1 65,968
1847 27 .9 48,703 19 .2 29,760 24 .6 78,463 18 .4 26,990
1852 18 .3 41,555 18 .6 34,352 18 .5 75,907 7 .2 17,790
857 22 .3 59,086 14 .3 27,507 19 .7 86,593 14 .5 13,994
1859 13 .9 46,789 13 .4 14,617 13 .8 61,406 5 .7 21,777
1865 10 .9 66,336 9 .7 35,810 10 .5 102,146 4 .2 47,839
1868 8 .4 100,424 6 .7 48,748 7 .9 149,172 2 .8 133,360
1874 5 .3 151,718 7 .0 71,109 5 .8 222,827 3 .5 181,211
1880 5 .5 195,063 6 .1 148,433 5 .7 343,496 3 .4 361,394
1885 3 .9 64,797 3 .4 114,689
1886 2.4 56,709 2 .3 120,857
1892 2 .9 73,003 2 .7 132,777
1895 4 .3 69,844 2 .1 101,190
1900 10 .2 41,190 2 .7 143,674
1906 4 .6 73,928 4 .0 197,064
1910(J) 2 .1 14,381 1 .8 284,996
1910(D) 2 .6 76,126 1 .8 230,549
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Table 6 .
	
Government Party Cohesion on Whipped Votes.
Year Simple Average Weighted Average Government Party
1836 .659 .642 L
1850 .594 .627 L
1860 .587 .618 L
1869 .612 .699 .L
1871 .741 .771 L
1875 .957 .965 C
1881 .832 L
	
.
1894 .898 - L
1899 .977 - C
1906 .968 - L
1908 .949 L
Source : cox,
	
1983, pp . 14-16 .
Note : Rice ' s coefficient of cohesion was used . Column 1 gives simple
averages and column 2 , weighted averages, where the weights are the
number of MPs participating in the division . Trivial divisions (nearly
unanimous) are excluded.
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Table 7. Crossbench Dissent and Split Voting . Dependent Variable : %
Crossbench Dissent .
1841-47 1852-57
Independent Estimated Estimated
Variables Coefficient t-ratio
	
Coefficient
	
t-ratio
Constant 6.91 3 .77 8.96
	
2 .27
SV* .72 3 .37 .41
	
2 .69
party -
	
.35 .15 6.17
	
.94
SV*xparty -
	
.69 3 .04 -
	
.27
	
.93
#obs = 63
R 2 =
	
.11
#obs = 87
R2 =
	
.18
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Table 8. Agreement of MPs Who Do and Do Not Share Constituency.
Panel I .
	
MPs Who Do Not Share Party:
1841-47
	
(N) 1852-57 (N) 1874-80 (N)
Do Not Share
	
29 .6
	
(214) 32 .7 (241) 27.1 (200)
Do Share
	
37 .2
	
(70) 42 .4 (104) 27 .2 (81)
7 .6 9 .7 .1
t
	
= 3 .12 t' = 3 .98 t = .04
Panel
	
II .
	
MPs Who Do Share Party :
1852-57 (N) 1874-80 (N)1841-47
	
(N)
Do Not Share
	
81 .4
	
(216) 72.5 (250) 90.7 (168)
Do Share
	
86.2
	
(231) 82.0 (226) 94.0 (155)
4
.8 9.5 3.3
t = 3 .79
	
t = 5.71
	
t = 2 .32
Source : Cox, 1983, p. 277.
Note : Entries are the average percentage of times the relevant kinds of pairs
of MPs agreed when both voted, for example, of all pairs of MPs
sharing neither party nor constituency in the Parliament of 1841-47,
the average agreement score was 29 .6%.
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Table A-1 . Simple Averages for Split Voting.
All
	
Constituencies Boroughs Counties
Year %
	
N % N % N
1832 18.5 76 20 .9 48 14.5 28
1835 23.9 80 25 .3 71 13.2 9
1837 15.5 88 16 .4 74 10.8 14
1841 10.9 82 11.1 74 8 .98 8
1847 24.6 65 25.5 59 15.2 6
1852 18.5 55 18.7 50 15.9 5
1857 22.5 44 23 .2 38 18.6 6
1859 14.4 47 15 .2 43 6.6 4
1865 11.8 61 12 .7 50 7 .7 11
1868 7.1 51 7 .6 29 6 .4 22
1874 5.5 52 5 .7 34 5 .1 18
1880 5.5 84 5 .9 52 4 .9 32
1885 3.5 15 3 .5 15
1886 2.2 15 2 .2 15
1892 2.9 14 2 .9 14
1895 3.1 12 3 .1 12
1900 4.8 13 4 .8 12
1906 3.9 15 3 .9 15
1910(J) 1.7 16 1 .7 16
1910(D) 2.0 17 2.0 17
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Table A-2. Weighted Averages for Split Voting, All Contest Types.
All
	
Constituencies Boroughs Counties
Year %
	
N %* % N % N
1832 15.4 231,768 38 17 .6 81,188 14.2 150,580
1835 18.6 140,585 22 20 .3 97,080 15.0 43,505
1837 10.6 189,291 26 12 .3 103,479 8.6 85,812
1841 7.6 155,778 20 8.5 102,673 5 .9 53,105
1847 23.3 140,029 17 25.0 111,714 16.3 28,315
1852 20 .4 129,702 15 21 .4 102,334 16.5 27,368
1857 17 .2 112,880 13 15.4 79,593 21.5 33,287
1859 11 .3 96,762 11 12.8 74,575 6 .2 22,187
1865 9 .2 150,402 16 11.7 84,718 5 .9 65,684
1868 6.6 313,824 17 7 .7 155,473 5.4 158,351
1874 8.0 439,687 21 9 .9 290,740 4.2 148,947
1880 6.6 741,540 32 8.2 444,196 4.3 297,344
1885 7.4 214,491 5 7 .4
1886 2.3 177,566 4 2.3
1892 2.7 205,780 5 2 .7
1895 6.3 218,817 5 6.3
1900 5 .1 218,559 4 5 .1
1906 4 .2 270,992 5 4 .2
1910(J) 1 .8 299,377 5 1 .8
1910(D) 2.0 306,675 5 2 .0
* Percentage of the total electorate.
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FOOTNOTES
*) Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Social Science History
Association, Washington, D.C
., October 27 - 30, 1983 . This research was
supported by NSF grant SES-8306032
. I would like to thank Professor John
R. Bylsma and Dr . James C
. Hamilton for allowing me to use their col-
lections of roll call data in the Parliaments of 1852 - 57 and 1874 - 80,
respectively.
1) Five major sources were used to collect these ballot counts: (1) Smith,
1 844 - 50 (reprinted, 1973) for the period 1832 -47 ; (2) Bean, 1890 for
the six northern counties 1832 - 80 ; (3) the collections of poll books in
the Institute of Historical Research (University of London), the Guild-
hall Library (City of London), and the British Library for the period
1832 - 68 ; (4) the collection of newspapers at the Colindale Annex of the
British Library for the period 1868 - 80 ; (5) Craig, 1974 for the period
1885 - 1910
. Approximately 15% of the ballot counts in the data set have
been "reconstructed" . That is, the original source document gave only the
plumpers (or some other partial information) from which it was possible
to infer the rest of the information based on certain mathematical rela-
tionships holding between the aggregate totals and ballot count informa-
tion
. The method used has been described in Mitchell, 1976, p . 112 . All
ballot counts have been checked for internal consistency
. That is, each
candidate's total number of votes has been calculated by adding up his
plumpers and double votes, and this figure has been compared to the
totals given in the source document (if available) or to the official
returns
. In roughly 8o% of the cases, the two figures agree exactly . In
only 13 ballot counts do the figures disagree by more than 3% and these
have been excluded from analysis.
2) The final authority used here on party affiliations before 1885 is F
. W.
S . Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1832 - 1885
. Indeed,
since Craig's policy is identical to that described in the text, all
party affiliations before 1885 agree with his
. After 1885, party affilia-
tions are as given in Appendix 1, F . W. S . Craig, British Parliamentary
Election Results, 1885 - 1918, except that Liberal Unionists have been
classed with the Conservatives, and Lib-Labs and Labourites with the
Liberals.
3) An interesting suggestion about the causes of split voting in general is
made in an 1866 article from the Fortnightly Review: At present we see
the larger proportion of the electors in the boroughs and county consti-
tuencies, where two members are to be chosen, give one vote to a Liberal
and another to a Conservative
. Thus they secure the grand object of
giving offence to neither party" (Wilson, r866)
. It would appear that the
author is referring to competing or cross-pressuring electoral influ-
ences
. A shopkeeper, for example, faced with a Tory landlord and an
important Whig customer, may have split his vote in order to offend
neither . Electoral influence is believed by some (e .g ., D
. C. Moore) to
have been declining in the 1860s and 1870s, and if it was generally
cross-pressuring, then this provides a possible explanation of the de-
cline in split voting
. We have, however, no firm basis for considering
cross-pressuring influence to be significant
. Most historians do not
mention it at all . Nossiter is the only historian to address the exi-
stence of cross-pressuring influence explicitly in regard to split vo-
ting, and he considers it unimportant, at least in the boroughs (Nossi-
ter, 1975, p . 179) . Further, the typical evidence given that electoral
influence was widespread presupposes that it controlled both votes, as
when Olney show that those Lincolnshire parishes wholly owned by Tory
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(Whig) Lords voted wholly Tory (Whig) - or nearly so (Olney, 1973, ch . 2).
If influence was complete rather than cross-pressuring, then its impor-
tance for a study of split voting is chiefly that it magnifies the
decisions of influential men in the statistics . We can consider a hypo-
thetical county constituency in which the electorate is dominated by a
relatively few landed magnates together with their numerous tenants, and
suppose that tenants always vote exactly as their landlords do : no hint
or breath of policy or party considerations crosses their minds . The
split voting rates in this county for the most part reflect the decisions
of the landlords, each being weighted by the number of his tenants . We
can hold the amount of influence constant, and produce virtually any
rates of split voting by stipulating the decisions of the landed mag-
nates . A decline in influence in such a constituency would produce de-
clines in split voting only if the formerly dependent voters tended to
cast fewer split votes than the landlords.
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